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A global workspace (GW) is a functional hub of binding and propagation in a population
of loosely coupled signaling elements. In computational applications, GW architectures
recruit many distributed, specialized agents to cooperate in resolving focal ambiguities. In
the brain, conscious experiences may reflect a GW function. For animals, the natural world
is full of unpredictable dangers and opportunities, suggesting a general adaptive pressure
for brains to resolve focal ambiguities quickly and accurately. GW theory aims to under-
stand the differences between conscious and unconscious brain events. In humans and
related species the cortico-thalamic (C-T) core is believed to underlie conscious aspects
of perception, thinking, learning, feelings of knowing (FOK), felt emotions, visual imagery,
working memory, and executive control. Alternative theoretical perspectives are also dis-
cussed. The C-T core has many anatomical hubs, but conscious percepts are unitary and
internally consistent at any given moment. Over time, conscious contents constitute a
very large, open set.This suggests that a brain-based GW capacity cannot be localized in a
single anatomical hub. Rather, it should be sought in a functional hub – a dynamic capacity
for binding and propagation of neural signals over multiple task-related networks, a kind of
neuronal cloud computing. In this view, conscious contents can arise in any region of the
C-T core when multiple input streams settle on a winner-take-all equilibrium. The resulting
conscious gestalt may ignite an any-to-many broadcast, lasting ∼100–200 ms, and trig-
ger widespread adaptation in previously established networks. To account for the great
range of conscious contents over time, the theory suggests an open repertoire of binding1
coalitions that can broadcast via theta/gamma or alpha/gamma phase coupling, like radio
channels competing for a narrow frequency band. Conscious moments are thought to
hold only 1–4 unrelated items; this small focal capacity may be the biological price to pay
for global access. Visuotopic maps in cortex specialize in features like color, retinal size,
motion, object identity, and egocentric/allocentric framing, so that a binding coalition for
the sight of a rolling billiard ball in nearby space may resonate among activity maps of LGN,
V1-V4, MT, IT, as well as the dorsal stream. Spatiotopic activity maps can bind into coherent
gestalts using adaptive resonance (reentry). Single neurons can join a dominant coalition by
phase tuning to regional oscillations in the 4–12 Hz range. Sensory percepts may bind and
broadcast from posterior cortex, while non-sensory FOKs may involve prefrontal and fron-
totemporal areas.The anatomy and physiology of the hippocampal complex suggest a GW
architecture as well. In the intact brain the hippocampal complex may support conscious
event organization as well as episodic memory storage.
Keywords: consciousness, awareness, attention, voluntary control, global workspace theory, cortex, theoretical
biology, brain dynamics
INTRODUCTION
This paper extends the Global Workspace (GW) theory of con-
scious experience to brain evidence, particularly the role of the
1The term “binding” was originally applied to the integration of many neural
sources of sensory features like color, visual field location, size, etc., and at higher
levels object and face identity, semantic category, and the like. As evidence for
higher level binding has built up, it is now also applied to the integrationof
cortex and thalamus (Baars, 1988, 2002; Dehaene and Naccache,
2001; Baars and Franklin, 2003, 2007; Dehaene et al., 2006; Shana-
han, 2010, 2012; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; etc.). While cortex
brief events, perceived causality, and self-object integration. All conscious con-
tents are internally consistent, as pointed out here, and combine numerous
receptor inputs into single, coherent, and voluntarily reportable objects or
events.
www.frontiersin.org May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 200 | 1
Baars et al. Dynamic global workspace theory
and thalamus look separate to the naked eye, they act as an inte-
grated system (Llinas and Pare, 1991; Edelman and Tononi, 2000;
Steriade, 2006; Freeman, 2007). A GW approach helps to organize
a large body of evidence and yields distinctive predictions2.
High quality empirical evidence has increased rapidly in recent
years, both for conscious state studies and for conscious contents.
State studies typically compare waking to slow-wave sleep, coma,
general anesthesia, and the epilepsies. Studies of conscious con-
tents compare conscious vs. unconscious cognition during the
waking state, using binocular rivalry, the attentional blink, back-
ward masking, and attentional manipulations. Both conscious and
unconscious stimuli trigger sensory volleys that can be traced well
into the cortex (Gaillard et al., 2009; Panagiotaropoulos et al.,
2012).
Global Workspace theory has been applied to numerous empir-
ical findings (e.g., Baars, 1988, 2002; Madl et al., 2011, 2012). Brain
imaging experiments have supported the best-known GW predic-
tion of “widespread integration and broadcasting” (Dehaene and
Naccache, 2001). That is, conscious stimuli typically evoke corti-
cal activity that is more widespread, intense, and correlated than
matched unconscious stimuli.
Some of the best evidence to date comes from Panagiotaropou-
los et al. (2012) building on almost two decades of findings from
intracranial recordings in the macaque. They used an experimen-
tal technique called “flash suppression,” involving a long-lasting
type of binocular rivalry between the conscious (perceived) but
not sensory (unperceived) visual channel. This method allows
for “contrastive analysis” of conscious vs. unconscious contents
with identical stimulus presentation to the two eyes. Previous
work from the Logothetis laboratory has shown conscious visual
stimulus representation in temporal regions including IT, MTL,
and the temporal association cortex. The most recent report
extends this to the lateral prefrontal cortex reporting, “neuronal
discharges in the majority of single units and recording sites in
the LPFC follow the phenomenal perception of a preferred stim-
ulus. Furthermore, visual awareness is reliably reflected in the
power modulation of high-frequency (>50 Hz) local field poten-
tials in sites where spiking activity is found to be perceptually
modulated.”
While conscious perception appears to be markedly more dis-
tributed and in higher signal fidelity as compared to matched
unconscious contents, this does not necessarily apply to other vari-
eties of cognition. Unconscious automatic skills and perceptual
inferences, parietal ego- and allocentric maps, sensorimotor con-
trol and implicit memory retrieval may show accuracy equal to, or
greater than matched conscious events. The brain basis for these
differences is not well understood.
This paper develops GW dynamics, suggesting that conscious
experiences reflect a flexible “binding and broadcasting” function
in the brain, which is able to mobilize a large, distributed collec-
tion of specialized cortical networks and processes that are not
conscious by themselves. Note that the “broadcast” phase pro-
posed by the theory should evoke widespread adaptation, for the
2Previous work is available at Cognitive Computing Research Group, The Univer-
sity of Memphis (http://ccrg.cs.memphis.edu/papers.html) Steriade (2006) we use
“C-T” to emphasize the driving role of the cortex.
same reason that a fire alarm should evoke widespread responding,
because the specific needs for task-relevant responders cannot be
completely known ahead of time. General alarms are interpreted
according to local conditions.
A brain-based GW interacts with an “audience” of highly dis-
tributed, specialized knowledge sources, which interpret the global
signal in terms of local knowledge (Baars, 1988). The global sig-
nal triggers reentrant signaling from receiving networks, allowing
for increasingly focused resonance between source networks and
receiving networks.
DYNAMIC GW VIS-À-VIS OTHER THEORETICAL PROPOSALS
We can widely divide current theories into philosophical and
empirically based ones. Some of the philosophical theories are
now generating testable hypotheses.
Empirical theories can be divided into “localist” vs. “local-
global” types. There are no exclusively global theories, since no
one denies the evidence for local and regional specialization in the
brain.
Philosophical theories typically aim to account for subjective
experiences or “qualia,” a notoriously difficult question. Recently
some philosophical perspectives, like“higher order theory”(HOT)
have also generated testable proposals about the involvement of
brain regions like the prefrontal cortex. However, brain imag-
ing experiments (e.g., Dehaene and Naccache, 2001) have long
implicated the frontoparietal cortex in subjective experience.
It is not clear at this time whether philosophically based theo-
ries generate novel, testable predictions. However, efforts are under
way to test HOT theories. In general, claims to explain subjective
qualia are still debated.
Empirical theories tend to start with reliable phenomena (See
Appendix A). For example, the limited capacity of conscious per-
ceptual contents has been discussed since the nineteenth century,
and continues to amass a large basis in reliable evidence. One of
the driving questions of GW theory is how the limited capac-
ity of momentary conscious contents can be reconciled with the
widespread access enabled by conscious contents.
Zeki (2001) makes the localist claim that conscious percepts of
red objects involve “micro-conscious” activation of cortical color
regions (visual areas V3/V4). However, most empirical theories
combine local and global activities, as briefly discussed above. It is
still possible that momentary events may be localized for 100 ms or
less, and that full conscious contents emerge over some hundreds
of milliseconds.
The Dynamic GW theory (dGW) is a specific version of the
“dynamic core” hypothesis proposed by Edelman and Tononi
(2000), and in somewhat different forms, by Edelman (1989) and
others. The cognitive basis of the theory was elaborated by Baars
(1988) and in subsequent papers with Franklin and others. Addi-
tionally, Dehaene, Changeux, and many coworkers have worked
out specific, testable experimental models.
Dynamic Global Workspace theory implies a directional signal
flow from binding to receiving coalitions. For each conscious event
there is a dominant source and a set of receivers, where the prop-
agated signal is interpreted, used to update local processes, and
refreshed via reentrant signaling to the source (Edelman, 1989).
Conscious sensations arise in a different center of binding and
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propagation than “feelings of knowing (FOK),” like the tip-of-
the-tongue (TOT) experience, as demonstrated by brain imaging
studies (Maril et al., 2001). Directional broadcasting of bound
conscious contents is one testable distinction from other propos-
als (Edelman et al., 2011). Supportive evidence has been reported
by Doesburg et al. (2009) and others.
Other theories, like Tononi’s mathematical measure of com-
plexity, phi, seem less directional (Edelman and Tononi, 2000).
Llinas and Pare (1991) have emphasized the integration of specific
and non-specific thalamocortical signaling, and Freeman et al.
(2003) have developed a conception of hemisphere-wide signaling
and phase changes.
Nevertheless, current local-global theories are strikingly simi-
lar. Whether major differences will emerge over time is unclear.
DYNAMIC GW AS A LOCAL-GLOBAL THEORY
In 1988 GW theory suggested that “global broadcasting” might be
one property of conscious events. Other proposed properties were:
1. Informativeness, that is, widespread adaptation to the nov-
elty of the reportable signal, leading to general habituation
(information reduction) of the news contained in the global
broadcast. The evidence now supports widespread neuronal
updating to novel input.
2. Internal consistency of conscious contents, because mutually
exclusive global broadcasts tend to degrade each other. This is
a well-established feature of conscious contents, first observed
in the nineteenth century and replicated many thousands of
times. Binocular rivalry is one well-known example.
3. Interaction with an implicit self-system. Baars (1988) pro-
posed that the observing self is coextensive with implicit frames
that shape the objects of consciousness. The notion of an
implicit self now has a great deal of psychological evidence
in its favor. Lou et al. (2010) have shown that it may involve the
precuneus and orbitofrontal cortex. Others have argued for a
midline brain system ranging from the PAG to the orbitofrontal
cortex.
4. Limited capacity, and an operating cycle of 100–200 ms. The
functional reason for conscious limited capacity has not yet
received a satisfactory explanation. We will sketch a possible
account below.
After almost a century of scientific neglect, many other aspects of
consciousness remain to be studied. In recent times two research
programs have pursued GW theory (GWT) in detail. A French
group led by Dehaene and Changeux have conducted almost
two decades of important research, focusing on formal models
of specific experimental paradigms that allow close comparisons
between conscious and unconscious conditions. This has been the
most systematic and focused modeling and testing program on
GWT, called “neuronal GW theory” by the authors. It continues
to increase in sophistication and empirical reach over time (e.g.,
Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).
Franklin and coworkers have pursued GWT in terms of a large-
scale cognitive architecture by (Baars and Franklin, 2003, 2007;
Snaider et al., 2011; Franklin et al., 2012). A series of published
papers by this group suggest a role for conscious events in working
memory, selective attention, executive functions, FOK, problem-
solving, the memory systems and broader biological functions (see
below).
Because almost all neural links in the cortico-thalamic (C-
T) system are bidirectional, reentrant signaling from receivers to
broadcasting sources may quickly establish task-specific signaling
pathways, in the same way that a fire department might locate
the source of a community-wide alarm, and, then, communicate
in a much more task-specific way. Current evidence suggest brief
broadcasts, as suggested by the ∼100 ms conscious integration
time of different sensory inputs.
THE REPORTABILITY OF CONSCIOUS EVENTS
Scientific theories often begin with intuitively plausible measures,
but in time they must explain those measures. “Accurate report”
has long been the most widely used behavioral index of con-
scious experiences (Baars, 1988). All of sensory psychophysics is
based on accurate report, but we have no accepted explanation
why conscious cognition should be reportable, while unconscious
cognition is not. We suggest an answer to this puzzle below.
CORTEX AND THALAMUS
Many brain regions have been proposed to underlie conscious
experiences, including the cortex, thalamus, brainstem reticular
formation, claustrum, zona incerta, colliculi, prefrontal cortex,
visual feature fields, thalamocortical projections, and the like.
Recent evidence (e.g., Damasio, 1989; Edelman, 1989; Steriade,
2006; Freeman, 2007; and others) from recordings in the living
brain support the “cortex plus thalamus” account for conscious
contents in the waking state, at least in humans and other primates
(Figure 1). Non-primates may utilize analogous brain structures,
like the avian pallium.
This C-T view is based on:
(a) Behavioral and brain imaging studies of cognition during
waking compared to sleep, drowsiness, distraction, extended
mental effort, sleep deprivation, coma, general anesthesia, and
other states.
(b) Direct intracranial stimulation and recording during specific
cognitive tasks, like speaking vs. listening to a word.
(c) Empirical dissociations between conscious vs. unconscious
brain conditions, like split brain surgery, cortical blindness
and parietal neglect. These phenomena can often be replicated
in healthy subjects using TMS, hypnosis, drugs, or behavioral
manipulations.
The case for the C-T system has recently been strengthened by
the use of TMS-EEG, a magnetic pulse aimed at a specific cortical
location while recording from a neurally linked one (Massimini
et al., 2005). For example, TMS applied to the left somatosen-
sory hand region leads to strong EEG pickup in the contralateral
hand region, much like a conductance meter in an electrical cir-
cuit. TMS-EEG may become the first practical, minimally invasive
measure of causal connectivity in cortex. It has been shown to
differentiate between conscious waking vs. sleep and coma, and
to distinguish behavioral coma from true coma (Rosanova et al.,
2012).
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FIGURE 1 | Binding and broadcasting from many locations. Four
alternative sources of binding and broadcasting in the C-T core. Sites of
possible binding and broadcasting are shown as yellow starbursts. Because
global broadcasts mutually interfere, only one can occur in any 100–200 ms
period. Global interference may explain the limited capacity of momentary
conscious contents. Areas V1 and IT: visuotopic maps include area V1, the
first cortical map for vision, and area IT, where conscious object
representations emerge (Logothetis, 1998). Different coalitions of
anatomically identical spatiotopic activity maps may lead to different
conscious experiences, like the sight of a single star on a dark night (V1) vs.
a coffee cup within arm’s reach (IT). Prefrontal cortex: non-sensory
“feelings of knowing” may bind and broadcast from non-sensory cortex.
Area MTL: we predict that the intact medial temporal cortex contributes to
subjective event organization as well as episodic memory coding (See The
Hippocampus and Conscious Contents: a Novel Prediction).
Damage to frontoparietal regions or connections may impair
the conscious state. Demertzi et al. (2012) and Blumenfeld (2012)
have therefore proposed a consciousness system including large
regions of frontal and parietal cortex. While this proposal helps to
explain waking state impairments, it does not include the classical
sensory cortices. However, sensory events are often thought to be
the prototypical contents of consciousness.
We suggest below that in the intact brain, sensory regions can
drive frontoparietal areas, so that both regions play essential roles.
More generally we propose that conscious events may arise any-
where in the C-T complex during waking, and that they may signal
many other loci in the C-T core (see Figure 1). This proposed
“any-to-many” recruitment is testable with current methods.
In many cases the original binding source specifies the quali-
tative conscious contents (the qualia), so that visually attributed
experiences are expected to be dominantly sourced in visual cor-
tex, while simple sounds arise in auditory regions. As we will see,
non-sensory regions of the cortex can give rise to FOKs, which are
richly endowed with reportable contents, even in the absence of
sensory cues.
In this view conscious experiences reflect flexible “binding and
broadcasting” in the C-T complex, interacting with subcortical,
striate and cerebellar regions. GW dynamics (dGW) emphasizes
the range and flexibility of binding and broadcasting. It may also
help to explain the feats of functional adaptation that can occur
after severe cortical damage (see Voluntary Reports of Conscious
Events).
Here we aim to preserve the simplicity of the theory while taking
into account a wider range of evidence.
Cortex and thalamus consist of multi-layered two-dimensional
arrays of neurons and their connective arborizations. Each array
projects topographically to others. Under the cortical mantle,
white matter pathways run in all canonical directions. These
long pathways are targeted in very precise and regular topogra-
phies. Local cortical links are also very numerous. Tractographic
studies indicate that the connectivity of the C-T system follows
small-world network properties (Sporns and Honey, 2006).
The C-T core constitutes by far the biggest parallel-interactive
structure in the mammalian brain, showing massive wave-like
activities during active states (Steriade, 2006). Most sensory path-
ways flow into the C-T system, while motor pathways flow outward
for subcortical, craniospinal, and autonomic control.
Hundreds of specialized regions of cortex have been identified,
and new ones continue to be discovered. Cortical regions are mir-
rored in major thalamic nuclei, most of which are also layered
arrays. Sherman and Guillery (2011) note that “any new informa-
tion reaching a cortical area. . . benefits from a thalamic region.”
Thalamic nuclei do not communicate with each other directly, but
only by way of cortical synapses.
Cortico-thalamic arrays are mutually linked via spatially con-
sistent “labeled lines.” For example, the small foveal center of each
retina subtends only 2–4˚ of visual arc, with about one million
densely packed cones and rods. Foveal patches can be roughly con-
sidered to be 1000× 1000 arrays of light receptors that are echoed
point-to-point in retinal ganglion cells, whose axons make up the
optic nerve. Ganglion cells are mirrored in the visual thalamus
(LGN), which transmit signals point-to-point to V1.
Labeled line coding implies that the relative locations of neu-
rons are preserved in higher level retinotopic maps. Beyond V1
visuotopic maps preserve a sparser copy of the visual field, while
cellular receptive fields increase in size and decrease in spatial reso-
lution. Spatiotopic mapping is regular and systematic throughout
the C-T complex. For instance, there are tonotopic maps in audi-
tory areas, body maps in the somatic regions, and similar such
maps in the motor cortex. At higher levels C-T arrays project to
self-centered and object-centered spaces, which must be coordi-
nated with each other to support a coherent domain of action
and perception. Multiple levels of inhibition serve to regulate and
sculpt the excitatory activity of the cortex and its satellites. Cortical
arrays therefore resemble the head-up cockpit display of a fighter
jet, which may show a geometric frame for the plane itself, another
frame for targets, and more for attackers and neutrals. When these
floating spatial frames intersect, they may alert executive networks
to make decisions.
Starting with LGN, all spatiotopic pathways become bidirec-
tional. Successive arrays pick up visual features like spatial fre-
quency, contrast, edge orientation, gestalt properties, hue, motion,
and object identity. Higher level properties like object perma-
nence, size constancy, color constancy, shape from shading, face
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and object recognition, scene analysis, movements, causality, and
event organization, all require complex interactions among 40 or
more spatiotopic arrays. The sight of a red traffic light must remain
stable in spite of differences in reflectance, observer motion,
background clutter, and changes in sunlight.
Figure 1 shows four examples of possible binding and broad-
casting in the C-T core (starburst icons). Cortical area V1 and the
visual thalamus (LGN) can be conceived as two arrays of high-
resolution bright and dark pixels, without color. The sight of a
single star on a dark night may therefore rely heavily on V1 and its
mirror array of neurons in LGN. V1 and LGN interact constantly,
with bidirectional signal traffic during waking.
The conscious sight of a single star at night reveals some
surprising features of conscious vision, including spatial context
sensitivity, as in the classical autokinetic effect: single points of
light in a dark space begin to wander long subjective distances in
the absence of spatial framing cues. The autokinetic effect is not
an anomaly, but rather a prototype of decontextualized percepts
(Baars, 1988). A large literature in perception and language shows
scores of similar phenomena, as one can demonstrate by looking
at a corner of a rectangular room through a reduction tube that
excludes external cues. Any two or three-way corner in a carpen-
tered space is visually reversible, much like the Necker Cube and
the Ames trapezoid. Such local ambiguities exist at every level of
language comprehension and production (Baars, 1988; Shanahan
and Baars, 2005).
The dorsal stream of the visual cortex provides egocentric and
allocentric “frames” to interpret visual events in nearby space.
These parietal frames are not conscious in themselves, but they
are required for visual objects to be experienced at all (Goodale
and Milner, 1992). Injury to right parietal cortex may cause the left
half of visual space to disappear, while contralesional stimulation,
like cold water in the left ear, may cause the lost half of the field to
reappear.
Thus even a single dot of light in a dark room reveals the con-
textual properties of conscious perception. Ambiguity and its res-
olution is a universal need for sensory systems in the natural world,
where ambiguity is commonly exacerbated by camouflage, decep-
tive signaling, distraction, unpredictable movements, ambushes,
sudden dangers and opportunities, darkness, fog, light glare, dense
obstacles, and constant utilization of cover by predators and prey
(Bizley et al., 2012).
Conscious percepts plausibly involve multiple “overlays,” like
map transparencies. The sight of a coffee cup may involve an object
overlaid by color, texture, and reflectance, combining information
from LGN, V1, V2, V3/V4, and IT (Crick and Koch, 1990). Active
cells in those arrays may stream signals across multiple arrays,
cooperating, and competing to yield a winner-take-all coalition.
Once the winning coalition stabilizes, it may “ignite” a broadcast
to other regions.
Conscious vision is strikingly flexible with respect to level of
analysis, adapting seamlessly from the sight of a single colored dot
to the perception of a dotted (pointillist) painting. An account of
conscious vision must therefore explain how a local dot can be
perceived in the same visual display as a Georges Seurat painting3.
3See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pointillism
To identify a single star at night, because the highest spatial
resolution is attained in the retina, LGN, and V1, the visual cortex
must be able to amplify neuronal activity originating in LGN-V1
through attentional modulation. For coffee cups and faces, the rel-
ative activity of IT and the fusiform gyrus must be increased. It
follows that binding coalitions of visual activity maps can bring
out the relative contribution of different feature levels, even for
the same physical stimulus (Itti and Koch, 2001).
BIDIRECTIONAL PATHWAYS AND ADAPTIVE RESONANCE
Because C-T pathways are bidirectional they can support “reen-
trant signaling” among topographically regular spatial maps. The
word “resonance” is often used to describe C-T signaling (Wang,
2001). It is somewhat more accurate than “oscillation,” which
applies to true iterative patterns like sine waves. Edelman and
coworkers prefer the term “reentry,” while others, like use “adap-
tive resonance.” We will use the last term to emphasize its flexible,
selective, and adaptive qualities.
Adaptive resonance has many useful properties, as shown in
modeling studies like the Darwin autonomous robot series, where
it can account for binding among visual feature maps, a basic
property of visual perception (Figure 2) (Izhikevich and Edelman,
2008). Edelman has emphasized that reentry (adaptive resonance)
is not feedback, but rather evolves a selectionist trajectory that can
FIGURE 2 | Feature binding by adaptive resonance. Darwin VII’s
biologically based visuotopic arrays employ adaptive resonance (reentry) to
transform optical input into neuron-like activation patterns. Darwin VII was
able to bind visual features given the known connectivity of visual cortical
areas V1, V2, V4, and IT. Some stimuli have positive or negative “value”
(incentives). The robot has goals and movement controls, and perceives
obstacles. Thus, the robot’s environment helps to constrain its behavior
using goals, rewards, obstacles, and the like.
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search for solutions to biologically plausible problems. Grossberg
and others have developed adaptive resonance models for cortical
minicolumns and layers.
A variety of high-level wave-like phenomena emerge in
the C-T system, including standing and traveling waves, spi-
ral vortices, centrifugal propagation, phase coupling and decou-
pling, microstates, cross-frequency coupling, and hemisphere-
wide phase transitions at theta-alpha rates (Freeman et al., 2003;
Izhikevich and Edelman, 2008). Complex waveforms in the core
range from 0.1 to 200 Hz, with momentary spikes up to 600 Hz.
The basic unit of the C-T is therefore not the single neuron, nor
the traditional one-directional sensory pathway. It is rather “a unit
of adaptive resonance,” which can be thought of as an artificial
neural network with at least two layers. Bidirectionality makes the
C-T core different from the cerebellum and basal ganglia, which
do not support conscious contents directly. Damage to the cere-
bellum does not directly impair conscious contents, though it can
devastate fine motor control. The cerebellum has parallel modules
and pathways comparable to a computer server farm, while the
C-T complex is parallel-interactive, so that any array of neurons
can signal any other. While the cerebellum is more“cognitive” than
previously thought, it does not directly enable conscious contents.
Most C-T activity is endogenous: “the cortex talks mostly to
itself.” With a few exceptions thalamic nuclei do not communi-
cate with each other directly, but are driven by cortical regions.
Steriade (2006) concluded, “The cerebral cortex and thalamus con-
stitute a unified oscillatory machine displaying different spontaneous
rhythms that are dependent on the behavioral state of vigilance.”
(Italics added.)
This is not to minimize the role of neuronal spike timing, which
is known to evoke synaptic plasticity. The C-T core may use mul-
tiple neuronal codes, including non-classical propagation via glial
cells, electromagnetic field induction, electrical synapses, and even
membrane ion currents. In conventional terms, brain rhythms
interact with single cell activity. Population rhythms require inter-
acting single cells that are both excitatory and inhibitory. Regional
rhythms like theta can also recruit single cells that phase-adapt to
the peak of the regional wave (Canolty et al., 2010).
Thus neural coding is simultaneously spatial and temporal.
The C-T nexus appears to be a vast, parallel-interactive signaling
medium, capable of local, regional, and global processing. Tononi
has proposed that only the C-T complex combines high integrative
capacity within perceived events along with high differentiation
between them.
Bidirectional signaling between linked arrays supports many
kinds of emergent signaling, just as random Brownian motion
allows for many kinds of acoustical wave propagation. Izhike-
vich and Edelman (2008) have shown that an accurate neuronal
simulation of the cortex gives rise to a range of macroscopic
waveforms from <0.1 to 200 Hz. Many oscillatory phenomena
have been observed in the cortex, including traveling waves, 4–
7 Hz microstates, vortices, and centrifugal propagation (Freeman,
2009).
FEATURE AND FRAME BINDING
Visual features are stimulus properties that we can point to and
name, like “red,” “bounded,” “coffee cup,” “shiny,” etc. Feature
binding is a well-established property of sensory perception.
There is much less discussion about what we will call “frame
binding,” which is equally necessary, where “frames” are defined
as visual arrays that do not give rise to conscious experiences, but
which are needed to specify spatial knowledge within which visual
objects and events become conscious. Powerful illusions like the
Necker Cube, the Ames trapezoidal room, the railroad (Ponzo)
illusion are shaped by unconscious Euclidian assumptions about
the layout of rooms, boxes, houses, and roads.
Unconscious assumptions that shape conscious features were
previously called “contexts” (Baars, 1988). Because that term is
now used with other meanings in the psychological literature, we
will adopt to word “framing,” which is in common use in the
social sciences. The best-known brain examples are the egocen-
tric and allocentric visuotopic arrays of the parietal cortex. When
damaged on the right side, these unconscious visuotopic fields
cause the left half of objects and scenes to disappear, a condi-
tion called hemi-neglect. Goodale and Milner have shown that
even normal visuomotor guidance in near-body space may be
unconscious. In vision the dorsal “framing” stream and “feature-
based” ventral stream may combine in the medial temporal cortex
(MTL) (Shimamura, 2010, see The Hippocampus and Conscious
Contents: a Novel Prediction below). Baars (1988) reviewed exten-
sive evidence showing that unconscious framing is needed for
normal perception, language comprehension and action plan-
ning. In sum, normal conscious experiences need both tradi-
tional feature binding and frame binding (Shanahan and Baars,
2005)4.
CONSCIOUSNESS ENABLES MANY KINDS OF ACCESS (FIGURE 3)
Animals live in a world of unknowns, surrounded by dangers,
and opportunities that may be fleeting, hidden, camouflaged, sur-
prising, deceptive, and ambiguous. Conscious brains may have
evolved to cope with such unknowns (Baars, 1988, 2002; Baars,
1988). Newell and colleagues built the first GW architecture to
perform acoustical word recognition, at a time when that task
was largely underdetermined (Newell, 1990). Their solution was
to build a computational architecture, a blackboard model, which
would allow many incomplete sources to compete and cooper-
ate to resolve some focal ambiguity. The result was remarkably
successful for its time in recognizing nearly 1,000 ordinary words
spoken in normal acoustical spaces, complete with hard echo-
ing surfaces, mumbling speakers, and soft, absorbent surfaces,
background noises, and the like. Speech recognition is now han-
dled with improved formant tracking, but even today, if semantic
unknowns arise in a spoken word stream, a GW architecture may
be useful to find the answer. We have no semantic algorithms that
interpret word ambiguities across many domains, the way humans
routinely do.
Baars and Franklin (2003) used GW theory to propose that con-
sciousness enables access between otherwise separate knowledge
sources. One major kind of access that has been discussed since
Emmanuel Kant is the access of the“observing self” to the contents
of consciousness. Lou et al. (2010) have shown that self-related
brain regions like the precuneus and midline structures from
4To avoid confusion, this paper uses the word “frame” instead of “context” for
unconscious constraints on conscious contents (Baars, 1988).
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FIGURE 3 | Conscious contents enable access to cognitive
functions, including sense modalities, working memory, long
term memories, executive decisions and action control. Executive
regions of the frontoparietal cortex gain control over distributed
unconscious functions via conscious feedback. (Cerf et al., 2010;
Shanahan, 2010).
the PAG to orbitofrontal cortex may be mobilized by conscious
sensory contents. Baars (1988) proposed that self-other access is
a specific variety of framing (contextualizing), and that it is a
necessary condition for conscious contents.
Global workspace architectures can also “call” fixed automa-
tisms. For example, in speech recognition word ambiguity may
be resolved by a known syntactic rule. A global broadcast of the
ambiguous word may recruit routines whose relevance cannot be
known ahead of time. We have referred to this as contextualization
or frame binding (Baars, 1988; Shanahan and Baars, 2005567). The
“frame problem” is a recognized challenge in artificial intelligence
and robotics, but it applies equally to living brains.
5The LIDA model suggests that cognitive processes involve cascading action-
perception cycles (Franklin et al., 2012), called cognitive cycles in the model.
After filtering for salience, each cognitive cycle produces a global broadcast that
both facilitates several modes of learning and recruits resources for consciously
mediated action selection. During the preconscious understanding phase of the
cognitive cycle, the current situational model (Franklin et al., 2012), acting as a
blackboard model, is updated by accessing previously learned information from
sensory memory, recognition memory, spatial memory, episodic memory and
semantic memory. The next contents of consciousness selects itself dynamically
from cognitive structures whose building blocks are the accessed cognitive repre-
sentations. Thus consciousness creates access leading to conscious thoughts and
subsequent actions.
Animals and plants co-evolve both accurate and deceptive sig-
nals, as in the case of monkeys, bees and flowers. In such an evo-
lutionary context the need to deal with ever-changing unknowns
may result in a constant adaptive pressure toward certain kinds
of brains. The C-T system occupies 80% of the cranial volume in
humans, mostly connective pathways between thin layers of neu-
ronal cell bodies. This costly organ must somehow improve adap-
tive fitness (Baars, 2002). Specialized algorithms like spinal reflexes
are crucial, but in the face of constantly evolving unknowns, a GW
architecture may provide a competitive edge. Here, we consider
how such a flexible adaptive capacity may be expressed in the
brain.
SPATIOTOPIC ACTIVITY MAPS, STREAMS, AND COALITIONS
Spatiotopic organization is common in the C-T core, including the
tonotopic maps of the auditory system, multimodal maps of pari-
etal cortex, and visual maps of the prefrontal cortex. Both sensory
6The term “oscillation” is often used to describe wave-like activity in the brain.
However, Freeman (2007) points out that there is no proof that wave-like activity
patterns return to their origins, like mathematical sine waves. The notion of reentry
and adaptive resonance indeed suggests the opposite.
7Major thalamic divisions are called “nuclei,” but they are typically layered arrays of
neurons that are tightly folded, so that they appear as clumps to the naked eye.
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input and neuromuscular output use spatial arrays. The senses
also converge on abstract spatial representations.
Thus the concept of a spatiotopic activity map (SA map) is
useful, defined as a pattern of neuronal activity over a spatiotopic
array of cells. We start with “activity maps” rather than structural
maps, because only a subset of the cells in any spatiotopic array is
active at any given moment. Therefore cortical and thalamic layers
can be treated as four dimensional matrices with indices (i, j, k, t ),
with positive or negative scalars for excitatory, or inhibitory cells
at time t. Active neurons can then be labeled CELL#<i, j, k, t> and
take on numerical values above or below a threshold during some
brief time period, perhaps 0.1 s, since neurons in cortex may fire
at a baseline 10 Hz rate. While this is highly simplified, it leads to
a sensible conception of a brain-based GW.
Figure 2 can be viewed as SA maps that combine with others
into SA streams; SA streams may compete or cooperate until some
winner-take-all coalition results in a stable outcome, perhaps as
briefly as the peak of the alpha or theta wave (Freeman, 2007).
Together, the many active layers of the visual cortex can act as a
resonant dynamical system that can yield an open set of visual
experiences over time.
ANY-TO-ANY SIGNALING
Figure 4 shows the major long-distance connections in the C-T
system of the macaque, including the basal ganglia (Modha and
Singh, 2010). It is consistent with the notion of “any-to-any” sig-
naling among SA arrays in cortex, mirrored in thalamic nuclei. Any
cortical array can signal any other, both directly and via thalamic
relays.
Modha and Singh also emphasize an “inner core” of high-
density connections, consistent with a Neural Darwinist perspec-
tive of synaptic growth and myelination by use. In effect, the white
matter pathways of the C-T system should reflect their traffic den-
sity, much as highway engineers would broaden highways to reflect
their maximum usage, while allowing low-density access to resi-
dential streets. High-resolution tractography of the white matter
pathways shows small-world network properties, consistent with
efficient allocation of neuronal traffic flow (Achard et al., 2006).
In the visual cortex, dynamic SA coalitions may represent a sin-
gle star on a dark night, a coffee cup on a nearby table, a simple
event such as a cup falling off a table, and the textured surfaces
of visual objects. Using the rich set of connectivities shown in
Figure 4, such a stable visual coalition can signal to other C-T
regions. The C-T system enables phase coupling and decoupling
among active spatiotopic arrays (see also Figures 5 and 6). Ste-
riade (2006) suggests a hierarchy of cortical oscillations ranging
from <1 to 200 Hz, able to partly depolarize large numbers of
neurons.
The functional anatomy of Figure 4 suggests a capacity for
“any-to-any” signaling among SA maps, streams, and coalitions.
Other authors report that C-T connectivities can be described by
small-world mathematics (Sporns and Honey, 2006), and Tononi’s
formal measure phi provides a global index of connectivity in the
C-T core. Such arrays of activity maps can also represent shifting
attentional focus in the visual cortex (Itti and Koch, 2001).
SA coalitions follow trajectories that evolve by adaptive reso-
nance. Edelman (1989) has made the case for genetic, ontogenetic,
and finally moment-to-moment selectionist processes in the brain.
Each selectionist stage shows replication, variation, and selection,
including the moment-to-moment dynamics of the C-T core.
Dynamic activity travels along pathways and synapses built by use,
which are constantly being pruned, beginning in the first month
in utero.
Entire visuotopic arrays can play inhibitory or excitatory roles,
so that SA maps can take on all positive or all negative values. This
is useful when the visual system needs to focus on a single level of
analysis, like a single colored dot in a Seurat painting, rather than
a gestalt of many colored dots.
BROADCASTING: ANY-TO-MANY SIGNALING
A few ants can secrete alarm pheromones to alert a whole colony to
danger, an example of any-to-many broadcasting among insects.
In humans the best-known example is hippocampal-neocortical
memory storage of memory traces in the neocortex by way of
the hippocampal complex (Nadel et al., 2000; Ryan et al., 2001).
Memories of conscious episodes are stored in millions of synap-
tic alterations in the neocortex (Moscovitch et al., 2005). We will
return to this point in section “Voluntary Reports of Conscious
Events.”
Computer users are familiar with global memory searches,
which are used when specific searches fail. The C-T system may
enable brain-based global memory searches. “Any-to-many” cod-
ing and retrieval can be used to store and access existing infor-
mation (Nadel et al., 2000; Ryan et al., 2010). It is also useful for
mobilizing existing automatisms to deal with novel problems.
Figure 4 shows how conscious visual stimuli may trigger a
burst of any-to-many signaling from the right visual cortex to
both hemispheres. By instructing subjects to attend to a lateral-
ized right or left stimulus while keeping the eyes physically fixated
on a target, either the right or left LED can be made conscious.
Notice that “any-to-many” signaling does not apply to the cere-
bellum, which lacks parallel-interactive connectivity, or to the
basal ganglia, spinal cord, or peripheral ganglia. Crick and Koch
have suggested that the claustrum may function as a GW underly-
ing consciousness. However, the claustrum, amydgala, and other
highly connected anatomical hubs seem to lack the high spa-
tiotopic bandwidth of the major sensory and motor interfaces,
as shown by the very high-resolution of minimal conscious stim-
uli in the major modalities. On the motor side there is extensive
evidence for trainable voluntary control over single motor units
and more recently, for voluntary control of single cortical neurons
(Cerf et al., 2010). The massive anatomy and physiology of cortex
can presumably support this kind of parallel-interactive band-
width. Whether structures like the claustrum have that kind of
bandwidth is doubtful. The sheer size and massive connectivity
of the C-T system suggests the necessary signaling bandwidth
for a human being to see a single near-threshold star on a dark
night.
We do not know the full set of signaling mechanisms in the
brain, and any current model must be considered provisional.
Neural computations can be remarkably flexible, and is, to some
degree, independent of specific cells and populations. John et al.
(2001) has argued that active neuronal populations must have
dynamic turnover to perform any single brain function, like active
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FIGURE 4 |The C-T complex supports any-to-any signaling.The
cortico-thalamic system allows any spatiotopic activity (SA) array to signal any
other. Combined with adaptive resonance, this allows an open set of cortical
and thalamic coalitions to bind and broadcast information from any region to
any other. The left half represents the left hemisphere of the brain, whereas
the right half represents the right hemisphere. The brain stem is shown at the
bottom. Circular color bars at the bottom describe the scale of the
corresponding anatomical ring.
muscle cells. Edelman and Tononi (2000) and others have made
the same point with the concept of a dynamic core. GW capac-
ity as defined here is not dependent upon the mere existence of
anatomical hubs, which are extremely common. Rather, it depends
upon a dynamical capacity, which operates flexibly over the C-
T anatomy, a “functional hub,” so that activated arrays make up
coherent “coalitions.”
The global neuronal workspace has been used to model a num-
ber of experimental phenomena. In a recent model, sensory stim-
uli mobilize excitatory neurons with long-range cortico-cortical
axons, leading to the genesis of a global activity pattern among
workspace neurons. This class of models is empirically linked
to phenomena like visual backward masking and in attentional
blindness (Dehaene and Changeux, 2005).
An advantage of the GW approach is that it is clearly func-
tional; that is, it describes a known architecture for integrating
and distributing focal information in a large-scale, massively par-
allel, brain-like organ. This functional architecture has been used
for practical applications since Newell and colleagues developed
it in the 1970s. However, it is a major challenge to scale neuronal
models to the level of real brains. Current neuronal GWT models
make use of simplified network architecture.
Franklin et al. (2012) have combined several types of com-
putational methods using a quasi-neuronal activation-passing
design. High-level conceptual models such as LIDA can provide
insights into the processes implemented by the neural mecha-
nisms underlying consciousness, without necessarily specifying
the mechanisms themselves. Although it is difficult to derive exper-
imentally testable predictions from large-scale architectures, this
hybrid architecture approach is broadly consistent with the major
empirical features discussed in this article. It predicts, for exam-
ple, that consciousness may play a central role in the classic notion
of cognitive working memory, selective attention, learning, and
retrieval.
STATES AND CONTENTS
WAKING AND DEEP SLEEP
In mammals all goal-directed behavior occurs in the waking state,
which enables fast, flexible, and widespread processing. State dif-
ferences can be seen with the naked eye in the scalp EEG, which
measures the post-synaptic activity of large numbers of cortical
pyramidal neurons whose axons run orthogonal to the scalp. How-
ever, scalp recordings reflect only 0.1% of the cortical voltage, so
that intracranial recordings give a much better picture.
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FIGURE 5 | Any-to-many signaling in conscious vision.While the
structure of the cortico-thalamic system suggests any-to-any
signaling, effective (causal) connectivity requires measures of signal
traffic flow rather than structural connectivity. Doesburg et al. (2008)
were able to show “any-to-many” signaling using simple LED stimuli
in the lateral periphery of each hemifield. The figure shows a
left-lateralized light stimulus triggering a broadcast from early right
visual cortex.
FIGURE 6 | Long-distance phase-locking in the waking state.The
waking state shows hidden regularities. During waking, intracranial EEG
shows phase-locking between different parts of cortex, and between the
hippocampus and neocortex. While the overall sound of the waking
stadium may seem random, local conversations can show precise phase
coupling. Notice that deep sleep and dreaming show almost no phase
coupling between distant cortical regions, or between cortex and
hippocampus.
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Waking EEG looks irregular, complex, and low in amplitude,
while deep sleep is marked by regular, simpler, and high-amplitude
waves, reflecting coordinated “buzz-pause” firing among billions
of neurons near 1 Hz. REM dreaming looks similar to waking, and
dreamers often report rich conscious experiences.
Spontaneous conscious mentation occurs throughout the wak-
ing state, reflecting repetitive themes described as “current con-
cerns”. Conscious mentation is also reported when subjects are
awoken from REM dreams and even from slow-wave sleep. The
last may reflect waking-like moments during the peaks of the delta
wave (Valderrama et al., 2012).
Thus the waking state appears to enable brain-wide, adaptive
resonance in the cortex and thalamus. By comparison, slow-wave
sleep – the least conscious state of the daily cycle – may interrupt
processing due to massive firing pauses in the trough of the delta
wave (Edelman and Tononi, 2000).
Both sleep and waking are under precise homeostatic state con-
trol (John et al., 2001), controlled by thalamocortical circuits timed
by basal brain nuclei. More than 200 types of epigenetic expres-
sion accompany sleep and waking in rats, suggesting many basic
biological functions. Sleep appears to be a survival necessity, since
rats die from complete deprivation after only 3 weeks. The exact
reason is still unknown.
GLOBAL CHATTING, CHANTING, AND CHEERING
Global brain states can be compared to a football crowd with three
states, “chatting,”“chanting,” and “cheering.”
Chatting describes the C-T activity of waking and REM dreams.
It involves point-to-point conversations among spatial arrays in
the C-T system, which can have very high S/N ratios, though
they appear to be random when many of them take place at the
same time. Like a football stadium with thousands of coordinated
local conversations that are not coordinated globally, the average
global activity is a low-level crowd roar, seemingly random, which
appears to be fast and low in amplitude. Nevertheless, as we will
see, direct cortical recordings show phase-coupled chatting in the
C-T core appears to underlie specific cognitive tasks. Thus chat-
ting activity gives the misleading appearance of randomness en
masse, but it is in fact highly organized in a task-driven fash-
ion. Because sports arenas show the same properties, the arena
metaphor provides us with a useful reminder.
Chanting shows coordinated start-stop crowd activity, about
once a second over a prolonged period of time, like the “buzz-
pause”rhythm of billions of neurons in the C-T core, which results
in global delta waves. Chanting sounds like chatting at the peak
of the delta wave, followed by simultaneous pausing, which inter-
rupts all conversations at the same time (Massimini et al., 2005).
Breakdown of cortical effective connectivity during sleep.
Deep sleep (also called delta sleep or slow-wave sleep) is the
least conscious state of the daily cycle, perhaps because 1–4 Hz
pauses during the DOWN hemicycle of delta disrupt any cognitive
tasks. However, there is some reported mentation when people are
awoken from delta sleep, suggesting that the peak activities may be
conscious or preconscious, so that during the process of awaken-
ing the chanting state is interpreted by the cortex in coherent ways.
Because we cannot get instant reports from sleep, it is not obvious
whether the reports are shaped by the seconds it takes to wake up.
Finally, a stadium crowd may cheer when a team scores a goal
or makes an error. This corresponds to an “event-related” peak
of activity. In the brain, the event-related potential (ERP) occurs
when a significant or intense stimulus is processed, causing a
stereotypical wave pattern to sweep through the brain. The event
ERP shows a series of negative and positive deviations over a period
of ∼600 ms, corresponding to early sensory processing (N100),
stimulus recognition, and attentional modulation (P200), deci-
sion making, and mismatch detection (P300 a and b), and stimulus
meaning (N400 and longer). Revonsuo and colleagues have found
that a conscious visual stimulus contributes a small negativity near
the P3b wave (see Figure 8). ERP peaks and valleys are sensitive
to numerous cognitive variables, but their overall shape tends to
remain stable. ERP waves show both stimulus-triggered resetting
and ongoing background activity.
In section “States and Contents” we suggested that the ERP
reflects a repeating perception-action cycle that is mostly uncon-
scious, but which embeds conscious moments lasting around
100 ms. The extended LIDA model interprets both conscious and
non-conscious components of such “cognitive cycles” (Franklin
et al., 2012).
Using direct brain recording in humans, Figure 6 shows that
the waking state enables fast, long-distance phase-locking in the
C-T core. Phase-locking is measured by lagged correlated activ-
ity among widely dispersed electrodes, and is believed to represent
signaling among the cortical arrays being recorded. In this case the
signal is measured in the low gamma band, 35–58 Hz, but strik-
ingly similar findings are common from<1 to 200 Hz. Delta, theta,
alpha, beta, and gamma phase coupling are commonly reported
for a variety of tasks. This very wide band of apparently functional
signaling is being studied intensively.
Phase coupling in the gamma range is tightly linked with the
waking state. Slow-wave sleep and REM dreaming show a dras-
tic drop in array-to-array gamma coherence. Observed gamma
synchrony may reflect underlying theta-gamma cross-frequency
coupling, which may in turn be carried by Slow Oscillation-theta-
alpha coupling, as suggested by Steriade (2006). Slow Oscillations
(SOs) continue throughout the daily cycle at <1 Hz. Widespread
SO’s may change the firing threshold among billions of neurons,
just as regional theta activity might do at a faster rate. A slow-to-
fast wave hierarchy is one way to coordinate large populations of
neuronal oscillators in the brain.
TASK-RELATED FREQUENCY COUPLING
A conscious task tends to recruits many cortical and subcor-
tical populations. A range of evidence suggests that phase-
coupled firing of large numbers of neurons is involved. Gamma
and alpha-range synchrony are implicated in the conscious
interpretation of ambiguous stimuli. However, alpha and theta
activity in large populations of cells has been observed in other
tasks as well. These ∼10 Hz oscillations may serve to group
faster rhythms such as beta and gamma. Both alpha-gamma and
theta-gamma phase coupling have been observed.
Direct brain recording suggests that task-specific activity
involves cross-frequency coupling at multiple spatial scales, link-
ing, and unlinking multiple sites in the C-T core and it satellites.
Single neurons can also self-adapt to regional theta oscillations
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(Canolty et al., 2010; Canolty and Knight, 2012). Population oscil-
lations and single neuronal spike timing may therefore mutually
entrain.
Figure 7 shows direct cranial recordings from the left hemi-
sphere in an epileptic patient, showing precise place-to-place
signaling underlying the gross “random-looking” activity of the
waking brain. Alpha-gamma and theta-gamma phase coupling
serves to coordinate neurons that may be widely dispersed, but
which support similar tasks.
In deep sleep, rapid interactive linking between regions may
continue during the “up” sweep of the delta/Slow Oscillation, but
it is inhibited during the “down” sweep (Edelman and Tononi,
2000).
CONSCIOUS CONTENTS
Traditional psychophysics compares conscious stimuli to each
other, a method that dates back to Newton’s prism experiments.
However, in a recent wave of research, conscious events are com-
pared to unconscious ones that are physically similar, though they
cannot be reported as conscious even under optimal conditions.
Many experimental paradigms allow for such comparisons. We
can therefore perform two kinds of comparisons for any con-
scious stimulus: psychophysical differentiation and iso-stimulus
contours to define the feature boundaries of the percept and para-
metric variation to specify the boundaries between conscious and
unconscious versions of the same event. When content parame-
ters can be precisely controlled we can therefore make claims about
the contents of consciousness during waking, dreaming, twilight
states, and even slow-wave sleep.
A CHANGING STREAM OF BOUND MOMENTS
The flow of conscious moments is often described as a stream
(James, 1890). Under careful experimental conditions perceptual
events appear stable and internally consistent. The Necker cube is
a useful example of a bistable stimulus that is perceived as inter-
nally consistent at any given moment. Perhaps all the words of
natural language are ambiguous in that they change meaning in
different contexts (Baars, 1988). Under normal conditions only
one meaning becomes conscious; the process of disambiguation is
usually unconscious. The stream of consciousness is therefore con-
stantly changing, but momentary events are perceived as stable and
consistent. It is plausible that the stream’s contents emerge from
ongoing winner-take-all competitions between activity streams
(see Consciousness Enables Many Kinds of Access).
Here we focus on spatiotemporal coding as described above.
However, this is a fast-moving frontier. While labeled line topo-
graphical resonance is a plausible contributor to the stream of
specific conscious experiences, the same mechanism in the dorsal
stream does not seem support conscious experiences directly (e.g.,
Milner and Goodale, 2008). This suggests that we may know some
necessary but not sufficient conditions for conscious contents
(viz., Baars, 1988). There are several other proposals for the ways
in which conscious events may be encoded in cortical activity
(Freeman, 2007). The full set of conditions is not yet known.
FIGURE 7 | Intracranial recordings in epileptic patients have 1,000
times the signal-to-noise ration of scalp recordings, and therefore
reveal much more detail. Crone et al. (2006) published these images of
the left lateral hemisphere in a conscious epileptic patient before surgery,
listening to a spoken word (A) and speaking it (B). Conscious patients in
this procedure experience little pain under local anesthetic. White
numbered disks are electrodes, and purple arrows between them indicate
event-related synchrony (ERS) as shown in the graphs. In Task (A)
“Hearing a word,” ERS bursts in four gamma bands occur 100–600 ms
post stimulus. In Task (B) “Speaking a word” ERS gamma starts before the
response, and continue during the next two seconds in 100–200 ms
bursts. Task (A) shows widespread left hemisphere ERS, while in Task (B)
is ERS is localized near Broca’s area for speech production. Other studies
show precise ERS bursts in cortex for sensory processing, response
organization and memory coding. Cortical synchrony may be a task-specific
signaling code.
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CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS TASK ELEMENTS
Efficient cognitive tasks optimize tradeoffs between conscious and
unconscious, and consciously mediated information processing.
As described above, the ERP is a stereotypical waveform lasting
about 600 ms, triggered by an intense or significant stimulus, and
usually averaged over trials to allow common population responses
to emerge while unrelated activity averages to zero. However, it has
been difficult to separate the conscious and unconscious aspects of
the ERP. New evidence shows that conscious (compared to uncon-
scious) visual stimuli trigger a small difference in the visual ERP,
emerging as a Visual Awareness Negativity (VAN) near the conven-
tional P3b waveform,∼300 ms after stimulus onset and lasting for
100–200 ms (Gaillard et al., 2009). The VAN is believed to sweep
forward from occipital-temporal regions (see Figure 8). These
results have been replicated more than a dozen times, with differ-
ent techniques. They suggest that the distinctively conscious signal
adds only a small energy component to unconscious background
processes, even though they may be triggered by the identical
sensory event.
While this may seem surprising given the subjective richness of
conscious events, it is not necessarily different from other kinds
of signal processing. The most obvious example is radio waves,
which use far more energy to propagate carrying waves than they
do for the contents of interest, which only modulate the carrier
wave. While analogies must be treated with care, there is evidence
that the intrinsic activity of the C-T core outweighs external input.
Thus cortical activity as shown in the visual ERP does not deter-
mine conscious contents directly. For example, the “novelty P3b”
wave reflects population responses to unexpected events, which
are processed unconsciously, but which may lead to conscious
percepts. The P3 a and b components may therefore reflect precon-
scious processes. As suggested, the stereotypical ERP may represent
a perception-cognition-action cycle in which a global broadcast
“ignition” is only one brief component (see Sensory percepts vs.
feelings of knowing below). Figure 8 shows the consciousness-
linked ERP component emerging in occipital cortex between 200
and 300 ms post stimulus, and followed by a late positivity (LP).
As pointed out, the C-T complex also engages subcortical satel-
lites like the cerebellum and basal ganglia, which do not determine
conscious contents directly.
WINNER-TAKE-ALL COALITIONS: MICROSTATES
Figure 9 shows evidence for stable microstates in the EEG
for both the rabbit and humans, exhibiting rapidly changing
phase after ∼100–200 ms, the rate of theta oscillations (Freeman,
2007). Other laboratories, using quite different methods, have
FIGURE 8 |VAN: the visual awareness negativity wave.The small
conscious content-linked component of the visual awareness ERP (VAN)
appears about 300 ms after a visual stimulus and lasts for 1–200 ms. It
appears to sweep forward, and may be followed by a late positivity (LP). The
VAN has been observed in more than a dozen studies comparing conscious to
unconscious visual stimuli that are identical at the retina.
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FIGURE 9 | EEG microstates at theta rates in humans and rabbits.
Global microstates have been found using several methods. Freeman et al.
(2003) used Hilbert analysis to observe fast phase changes at theta rates in
entire cortical hemispheres in humans and rabbits. The vertical axis shows
phase differences in radians, revealing stable states for 100–200 ms,
interrupted by a hemisphere-wide near–instantaneous collapse for 5–10 ms
before a new equilibrium is achieved. The horizontal axes show time (in ms)
and electrodes.
also reported momentarily stable, content-sensitive microstates.
The current theory suggests that microstates represent binding
and broadcasting equilibria involving dynamic coalitions of adap-
tively resonant populations of neurons. This view seems quite
compatible with sophisticated theoretical work by Freeman and
Kozma. Crick and Koch (2005) suggested the term “coalitions” for
this general concept.
Coalitions can be linked to conscious (rather than unconscious)
stimuli even at the level of single cell activity. In an important
experimental series, Logothetis and colleagues recorded directly
from visual cortical neurons in the macaque, while presenting
rivaling stimuli known to evoke activity from edge detection to
visual object identification. Neuronal competition and coopera-
tion appeared in established cortical feature maps, with a decisive
majority of neurons firing to the conscious percept only in the
visual object area, corresponding to inferior temporal cortex (area
IT) in humans. Thus, conscious, but not unconscious, visual
stimuli evoked a decisive “vote” of neurons in IT.
Logothetis et al.’s research program continues to yield spec-
tacular results including the strongest direct evidence for global
distribution of conscious visual stimulation to date (Panagio-
taropoulos et al., 2012). More recent studies indicate involvement
of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which also has visuotopic
maps. However, the bilateral removal of the prefrontal cortex does
not abolish binocular rivalry, suggesting, again, that binding of
visual input is not localized in a single region, but varies dynam-
ically depending on stimulus, task, anticipatory set, emotional
valence, memory load, distractors, and perhaps cortical resource
allocation.
Several laboratories have now reported EEG microstates last-
ing 100 ms or longer, and correlated with conscious contents. In
our terms, microstates show momentary equilibria in the C-T
core. Freeman and colleagues provide a sophisticated non-linear
dynamical interpretation of microstates. Adaptive resonance
among topographically organized arrays leads to a dynamic system
trajectory that may (1) land in a local minimum, (2) diverge and
dissipate, or (3) even lead to a destructive positive feedback loop.
Positive feedback among excitatory neurons resembles an epilep-
tic seizure, and large-scale simulations of the cortex do show such
activity. However, excitatory activity is constantly regulated by
local, regional, and global inhibition, keeping the resonant trajec-
tory between dysfunctional boundary states. Over time, adaptive
resonance therefore either disappears, or it may evolve a temporary
but stable equilibrium.
Since “binding” and “broadcasting” involve adaptive resonance,
the distinctive type of signaling in the C-T core, dGW suggests
“binding resonance” to define the winner-take-all gestalt that
becomes conscious and “broadcasting resonance” to propagate the
winning gestalt to receiving networks.
A human analogy for broadcasting resonance would be a col-
lege class equipped with feedback clickers to respond to points
made by a lecturer. Signaling goes in both directions, and clickers
may be used to ask the lecturer to explain some point in greater
detail, so that signal receivers can influence the duration of the
broadcast. Broadcasting leads to widespread adaptation among
receiving processors (Baars, 1988, see Sensory Percepts vs. Feelings
of Knowing); by analogy, a lecture leads to widespread learning. If
students need more time to understand a broadcast, they can use
their clickers to keep the broadcast signal flowing until they can
adapt to it.
The most interesting possibility is that reported microstates
reflect both binding and broadcasting in the brain, much like
double-wing Lorenz attractors. Using a Hilbert analysis of the
cortical EEG, Freeman et al. (2003) report that electrophysio-
logical equilibria reflect a hemisphere-wide spatial phase change,
occurring at theta rates. Future work will explore this link.
Recent evidence shows that single neurons can phase-tune their
firing to regional theta oscillations, allowing single cells to coordi-
nate with population activity (Canolty et al., 2010). Single cortical
neurons can also come under voluntary control (Cerf et al., 2010),
suggesting that even single units can serve executive goals.
CONSCIOUS MOMENTS ARE EMBEDDED IN CYCLES
The stereotypical ERP spins out over some 600 ms, reflecting basic
population activities in processing incoming signals. Conscious
moments are believed to last only 100–200 ms, and their distinctive
signal appears to be small (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2007). Franklin
et al. (2012) have suggested that binding and global broadcasting
is only one part of the recurrent action-perception cycle (Fuster,
2004). While conscious moments lasting ∼100 ms may interfere
with each other, the unconscious or automatic half-second of the
cognitive cycle may overlap. Automatic skill components interfere
less with each other than conscious contents.
Conscious binding and broadcasting seems to be largely a
cortical-thalamic event that may trigger output to the striatum
of the basal ganglia, a major output hub, which loops back to thal-
amus and cortex, providing a pathway for a recurrent unconscious
cycle (Cole and Schneider, 2007).
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SENSORY PERCEPTS VS. FEELINGS OF KNOWING
James (1890) emphasized that conscious contents are not just sen-
sory; they include what he called “fringe” experiences or FOK,
such as the TOT experience, accurate judgments, concepts (as
opposed to percepts), relational terms like “and,” “or,” “but,” vivid
expectations, beliefs, and other non-sensory but reportable events
(Table 1). FOK show distinct BOLD activity in the frontal cor-
tex, with fewer sensory maps than posterior cortex (Maril et al.,
2001). Frontal cortex impairments also increase vulnerability to
word retrieval difficulties (Pannu and Kaszniak, 2005).
Dynamic Global Workspace theory suggests that FOKs are
bound and propagated from non-sensory regions of cortex, such
as the classical association areas, frontoparietal regions, and the
anterior temporal cortex. Brain imaging suggests that seman-
tic knowledge is distributed in temporal, frontal, and parietal
cortex, while sensory regions are recruited for imagery, inner
speech, and motor activities that are associated with abstract
concepts. However, effortful FOKs appear to be relatively local-
ized in DL-PfC and ACC regions. Effort-related BOLD activ-
ity spreads outward as tasks grow more difficult (Tables 2
and 3).
Feeling of knowing are not imprecise in their underlying con-
tents. They are simply subjectively vaguer than the sight of a coffee
cup (Baars, 1988), lacking clear figure-ground contrast, differen-
tiated details and sharp temporal boundaries. However, concepts,
judgments, and semantic knowledge can be complex, precise, and
accurate. The history of science and mathematics is filled with
examples of accurate, but subjectively vague, insights that could
not be articulated and tested until much later.
Table 1 | Subjectively vague feelings of knowing.
The tip of
the tongue
TOT state shows semantic knowledge while searching for a
missing word. TOT’s activate prefrontal regions fMRI (Maril
et al., 2001*).
Judgments Judgments of beauty, goodness, moral value, confidence,
familiarity, rightness, etc., lack perceptual features and
shapes, figure-ground contrast, specificity in space, time




Prepositions like “to,” “from,” “by,” and relational terms like
“above,” “below,” “before,” and “after” are not perceptual,
though they may evoke feelings of knowing.
Table 2 | A summary of hypotheses.
Any-to-many binding and broadcasting in the C-T system
Perceptual consciousness vs. feelings of knowing
Dominant coalitions
Task-related chatting via phase coupling and decoupling
Feelings of effort interpreted
Voluntary control involves binding and broadcasting in the prefrontal lobe
Voluntary attention
The relationships to states of consciousness
The generality of adaptive resonance in C-T biocomputation
Thus, Fermat’s Last Theorem occupied mathematicians for
centuries, as a compelling but unproven FOK. Inexplicit but
subjectively persuasive FOKs are a recognized route to math-
ematical discovery. In the brain, semantic knowledge is widely
distributed and seems to lack figure-ground contrast.
Tip-of-the-tongue experiences can be induced by asking for
the technical names of familiar facts. The question “What are
two names for flying dinosaurs?” may elicit strong FOK. Subjects
who cannot recall those names still choose accurately and quickly
between “pterodactyl” and “brontosaurus.” Semantic knowledge
may be fully primed in TOT states, before the lexical form of the
missing words can be recalled. Such FOK commonly occur when
we have compelling and accurate expectations and intentions.
They are not limited to language.
Psycholinguistic experiments have long shown that semantic
access occurs routinely without lexical recall. Thus many meanings
do not have to be expressed in words. FOK can therefore be
conceptually rich and precise (Baars, 1988).
Table 3 | Some testable predictions.
1. The cortico-thalamic system supports any-to-many binding and
broadcasting of conscious contents. A bound conscious gestalt may
emerge from anywhere in the cerebrum, and spread globally to all other
regions for ∼100 ms.
2. Receiving networks adapt to novel information from broadcast sources.
After widespread receiver adaptation (updating), broadcasts are driven out
of consciousness by competing inputs.
3. Posterior cortex generates perceptual conscious contents, while explicit
feelings of knowing are generated from non-sensory cortex. (Frontal,
anterior temporal, parietal). Many cognitive tasks involve both a conscious
perceptual and a reportable semantic broadcast, as shown in the extended
ERP.
4. Since nearly all cortico-thalamic links are bidirectional, the cerebrum
supports very widespread adaptive resonance (reentrant signaling).
Signaling of conscious contents is superimposed on baseline resonant
activity in the C-T core. Because of spatiotopic array organization in the
cortex and thalamic nuclei, content signaling in the cerebrum is
simultaneously spatial and temporal.
5. Goal-directed signaling in the C-T core is waking state dependent.
Waking, dreaming and slow-wave sleep reflect distinct global modes.
However, even slow-wave sleep may support waking-like activity during
the UP phase of the slow oscillation.
6. While many spatiotemporal codes may exist, cross-frequency phase
coupling is thought to integrate the full range of C-T rhythms. Because
conscious sensory events are integrated within 100 ms periods, 4–12 Hz
rhythms may underlie conscious moments.
7. Effortful voluntary control involves binding and broadcasting from
frontoparietal regions. Mental effort is an FOK that is associated with
major cognitive styles like persistence and general intelligence.
8. The hippocampal complex supports conscious event perception, as well
as serving to encode episodic memory traces in multiple brain regions.
Hippocampal lesions often lead to cortical reorganization of conscious
sensory functions.
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MENTAL EFFORT
The sense of mental effort is an important FOK. It commonly
occurs in the TOT experience, but also in a range of other tasks
that are difficult, slower than expected, require persistence, or
involve goal conflict. Duncan and Owen (2000) have done exten-
sive research on this topic, and found that subjective mental effort
activates executive regions of the frontal cortex (DL-PFC and ACC)
across a variety of tasks. Mental effort may underlie the general
intelligence factor g, which is found robustly across tests, tasks,
and cultures. It may also correspond to the major personality vari-
able persistence, which may explain its cross-cultural relevance,
since persistence is needed for high performance in tasks that may
be desirable in different cultural contexts. Baumeister has discov-
ered closely related phenomena under the labels “willpower” and
“ego depletion.” While these terms have an old-fashioned flavor,
they are solidly based in evidence. For example, subjective mental
fatigue accumulates during the waking day and may be relieved by
increasing self-esteem.
Duncan and Owen (2000) explain subjective effort by a Multi-
ple Demand System (MDS) of the prefrontal cortex. MDS is closely
related to dGW, since any region of the C-T system may serve as a
binding and broadcasting site according to the argument we have
developed.
VOLUNTARY ATTENTION
In a GW perspective, attention is any process that facilitates access
to conscious contents, much as eye movements enable access to
specific visual events. Visual attention is associated with the eye
movement control system, the frontal eye fields and superior
colliculi. Cole et al. (2012) have proposed a “cognitive control
system” for voluntary attention that involves global connectivity
from the prefrontal cortex, and which predicts cognitive control
and intelligence. This seems to be another aspect of the mental
effort phenomenon discussed above. Goal-driven attention also
selects conscious sensory information to recruit, plan, and carry
out extended tasks in the world.
The key claim from GW theory regarding dynamics is therefore
that conscious contents bind sensory or other cortical-thalamic
contents into a winner-take-all coalition, able to broadcast to other
regions of the C-T system. No single C-T location is a privileged
source.
Figures 1 and 10 (above) showed four hypothetical “binding
and broadcasting” sources in cortex, V1 for simple stimuli like a
bright star on a dark night, a set of visual areas including IT for
object representation at multiple levels, and the MTL/rhinal cortex
for event organization.
Prefrontal activation across multiple tasks demanding mental
effort (Duncan and Owen, 2000) suggests that sensory conscious
experiences are bound and broadcast from the classical sensory
regions in the posterior cortex, while voluntary effort, reportable
intentions, feelings of effort, and the like, have a prefrontal origin,
consistent with brain imaging findings. Figure 10 also suggests
that FOK and effort are bound and broadcast from the prefrontal
cortex, notably the dorsolateral and anterior cingulate regions,
areas that are known to be involved in subjective feelings of effort.
These findings suggests an hypothesis about sensory conscious-
ness compared to “fringe” FOK, feelings of effort, and reportable
FIGURE 10 | Perceptual experiences vs. feelings of knowing (FOKs).This
dGW cartoon shows an occipital broadcast (which must mobilize parietal
egocentric and allocentric maps as well) evoking spatiotopic activity in the
prefrontal cortex, which is known to initiate voluntary actions (see yellow
arrow). Prefrontal activity is shown as a second global workspace burst,
consistent with Figure 1. Visuotopic coding is preserved in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex. The ability to voluntarily report or act upon a spatially
specified stimulus follows from this double binding and broadcasting event.
Thus, a posterofrontal broadcast is quickly followed by a centrifugal burst
from prefrontal regions, including supplementary motor, premotor, and
motor cortex. Posterior binding and broadcasting is experienced as a visual
event framed in nearby space, while the prefrontal broadcast is a feeling of
knowing (FOK) or “fringe” experience (James, 1890).
voluntary decisions. These reportable but“vague”events have been
discussed since William James, who gave them equal importance
to perceptual consciousness. fMRI studies show that they predom-
inantly involve prefrontal regions, even across tasks that seem very
different.
Because of the small-world connectivity of white matter tracts,
different integration and distribution hubs may generate different
global wave fronts. The sight of a coffee cup may involve an infero-
temporal hub signaling to other regions, while the perception
of music may emerge from Heschel’s gyrus and related regions.
Reportable experiences of cognitive effort might spread outward
from a combined DL-PfC/ACC hub.
CONSCIOUS EVENTS EVOKE WIDESPREAD ADAPTATION OR UPDATING
What is the use of binding and broadcasting in the C-T system?
One function is to update numerous brain systems to keep up
with the fleeting present. GW theory suggested that consciousness
is required for non-trivial learning (i.e., learning that involves nov-
elty or significance) (Baars, 1988). While there are constant efforts
to demonstrate robust unconscious learning, after six decades of
subliminal vision research there is still surprisingly little proof.
Subliminal perception may work with known chunks, like facial
expressions. While single-word subliminal priming appears to
work, Baars (1988) questioned whether novel two-word primes
would work subliminally. The subliminal word pair “big house”
might prime the word “tall,” while “big baby” might not, because it
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takes conscious thought to imagine a baby big enough to be called
tall. In general, the more novelty is presented, the more conscious
exposure is required.
It follows that dGW should predict widespread adaptive
changes after conscious exposure to an event. That is indeed the
consensus for hippocampal-neocortical memory coding (Nadel
et al., 2012). However, the hippocampal complex is not currently
believed to enable conscious experiences. Nevertheless, episodic
memory is by definition “memory for conscious events” (See
The Hippocampus and Conscious Contents: a Novel Prediction).
Conscious events trigger wide adaptation throughout the C-T sys-
tem, and in subcortical regions that are influenced by the C-T
system. Figure 11 shows how novel, conscious tasks trigger wide-
spread adaptive processing in the C-T core, while the identical
task after repetition to the point of automaticity no longer requires
high-metabolic C-T processing. Episodic, semantic, and skill (pro-
cedural) processing all follow the same curve of high-metabolic
processing to novel, conscious learning followed by a drastic drop
in conscious access and metabolic (BOLD) activity after learning.
Figure 11 shows an example for auditory search, showing
BOLD peaks in many cortical locations, but fading after auto-
maticity due to practice, except in primary auditory cortex. Per-
formance improves as the BOLD signal fades and conscious access
recedes (Schneider, 2009). Cortical BOLD fading after training is
a robust fact, indicating that conscious (reportable) events evoke
widespread adaptation at multiple levels, from single neurons to
entire brains (Baars, 1988; Gomez et al., 2009). Adaptation to
novelty has been proposed to be one of a small set of necessary
conditions for conscious experience (Baars, 1988, Chapter 12).
CONSCIOUSLY MEDIATED COGNITION
Most cognitive tasks combine conscious and unconscious ele-
ments. If we assume from a GWT perspective that conscious
task moments allow novel integrations while unconscious ones
implement automatic routines, we can see why fill-in sentences,
cued recall, remote associates, “Aha!” experiences and ambigu-
ous stimuli are consciously mediated. Baars and Franklin (2003)
suggest that all working memory tasks are consciously mediated –
inner rehearsal, executive control, and other WM elements are
all claimed to require a conscious cue to execute. If we rehearse
seven numbers, some are conscious at any moment, but others are
not. We are not aware of non-rehearsed items at any moment in
a working memory task, nor of the important role of the basal
ganglia in controlling inner speech, or of the automatic (habitual)
components of any task. Completely conscious tasks are rare.
Standard tasks in cognitive neuroscience are generally con-
sciously mediated, yet classical notions of cognition give no func-
tional account of that easily observable fact. Standard cognitive
tasks like working memory recall could not be done if they were
masked by momentary distractions. Apparently the conscious ele-
ments of cognitive tasks are often necessary for those tasks to be
carried out. Conscious mediation of task elements appears to be
mandatory, not optional.
From a GW point of view the answer is straightforward: all tasks
that involve unpredictable choice points require global broadcast-
ing to recruit knowledge sources. Baars (1988) devoted several
chapters to the near-universality of ambiguity in human cognition,
including perception, working memory, memory retrieval, vol-
untary attention, action planning, and voluntary motor control.
When fully predictable tasks are rehearsed to the point of auto-
maticity they tend to drop from consciousness; conversely, when
ambiguity is introduced in predictable situations, more conscious
involvement is required. The first GW architecture developed
by Newell and coworkers was explicitly designed to resolve the
multi-level ambiguities of auditory words spoken in a normal
noisy space.
Thus GW theory provides a general answer to the question: why
are consciously mediated tasks so common? At the same time, it
FIGURE 11 | Cortical adaptation as a novel task becomes automatic.
Schneider (2009) summarized a large literature on habituation of over learned
skills. On the left, high BOLD activations are shown in the cognitive control
system of the cortex, including the posterior parietal cortex and executive
regions of the prefrontal cortex. After the task is practiced to the point of
automaticity, only the auditory region of the temporal cortex shows fMRI
activity, as required for the auditory detection task. The BOLD signal
corresponds to neuronal population activities. These results are consistent
with dynamic Global Workspace theory in that the novelty stage involves
more conscious and voluntary processing.
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suggests a qualitative answer to the close link between task novelty
and conscious access.
VOLUNTARY REPORTS OF CONSCIOUS EVENTS
Conscious contents are routinely assessed by voluntary report,
as we know from 200 years of scientific psychophysics. Yet the
reason for that fact is far from obvious. Any theory of conscious-
ness must ultimately explain the basic fact that we can voluntarily
report an endless range of conscious contents, using an end-
less range of voluntary actions. GWT suggests the shape of an
answer.
Voluntary control is one kind of consciously mediated process.
As we learn to ride a bicycle for the first time, each movement
seems to come to consciousness. After learning, conscious access
drops even as BOLD activity in the C-T core declines (Figure 11).
We postulate that conscious involvement is necessary for non-
trivial acquisition of knowledge and skills, and that the period
of conscious access enables permanent memory traces to be
established.
While “verbal report” is the traditional phrase, reports do not
have to be verbal – any voluntary response will work. Broca’s
aphasics who are cannot speak can point to objects instead.
Locked-in (paralyzed) patients, who seem to be comatose, can
learn to communicate by voluntary eye movements. Thus “verbal
report” should be called “accurate, voluntary report,” using any
controllable response.
Voluntary actions can point to objects and events. A “match
to sample” task is commonly used to indicate the similarity of
two conscious events, and to specify just noticeable differences.
Pointing occurs naturally when mammals orient to a novel or
significant stimulus. Children develop pointing abilities using
“shared attention” in early childhood.
If we assume for simplicity that conscious contents emerge in
posterior cortex, and that voluntary actions emerge in frontal and
parietal cortex, we can ask the question in dGW terms: how is it
that a posterior “binding and broadcasting” event is transformed
into a frontally controlled action?
These facts raise the question of how accurate signal transmis-
sion occurs between sensory arrays and frontal executive control.
In the case of pointing to a single star on a dark night, the phys-
ical minimum of light quanta in the retina can be amplified and
transmitted to prefrontal cortex, which can control the movement
of a single finger to point to the star. Even more remarkably, sin-
gle neurons in the temporal cortex have been shown to be fired
at will in surgical patients using intracranial electrodes, provid-
ing only that conscious sensory feedback is given during training
(Cerf et al., 2010). Thus the physical minimum to the eye can accu-
rately translate into “any” voluntarily controlled single cell, used
as a sensory pointer. Given a million foveal cells for input, and
perhaps billions of cortical cells for output,“any-to-any” mapping
in the brain can involve remarkably large numbers. With accu-
rate psychophysical performance in both tasks, the signal to noise
ratio from receptor to effector cell can approach the physical limit.
This precision needs explanation in terms of conscious input and
voluntary control.
Figure 10 gives a dGW account of a conscious sensory expe-
rience spreading proposes a double broadcast, the sensory one
emerging from occipitoparietal regions, and the voluntary one
(which may be subjectively effortful) coming from prefrontal
executive cortex.
This also suggests an explanation for the standard index of vol-
untary report. When we report a star on a dark night, posterior
broadcasting may lead to frontal binding and ultimately a frontal
broadcast. Frontoparietal regents are driven by posterior sensory
projections when they become conscious. Because of the striking
similarities of spatiotopic coding in frontal and posterior cortices,
we can image that sensory consciousness can also trigger a new
binding, and broadcast an event in the frontal cortex. Voluntary
action is therefore an extension of GW dynamics.
Figure 12 shows an intracranial electrode grid recording of
the left hemisphere of an epileptic patient with implanted cortical
electrodes for presurgical testing. It shows a word being perceived
consciously, and after a suitable delay, being reported. The depen-
dent variable in Figure 12 is gamma synchrony bursts in four
different frequency ranges (67–117 Hz).
For the first time in history we are able to look at the cortex
in real time and with high spatial resolution as the patient hears
a spoken word and then reports it. In both conditions, hearing
and reporting, we can see phase coupling bursts in the left LIFG
(lateral inferior frontal gyrus), Broca’s area. A dGW interpreta-
tion would suggest a broadcast from auditory cortex in the first
condition (a), spreading to Broca’s area and setting up adaptive
resonance lasting for several seconds (about the duration of work-
ing memory, 10–30 s). When the patient repeats the word in part
(b) the relevant speech production regions are already primed by
the stimulus broadcast. This account is still sketchy, since we only
see two snapshots in time. However, we can use dGW to make
more precise and testable predictions.
THE HIPPOCAMPUS AND CONSCIOUS CONTENTS: A NOVEL
PREDICTION
Hippocampus is generally thought to encode episodic memories
but not conscious experiences. This is puzzling, since episodic
memories come from conscious episodes in the first place. It would
be odd if these twin functions were not linked.
Because the neocortical-thalamic system arose with mammals
some 200 million years ago, some kinds of consciousness appear to
be evolutionarily ancient. Neurobiologists are increasingly search-
ing for brain homologs and analogs of the C-T system found in
mammals. What G. M. Edelman calls “higher level” (symbolic)
consciousness would be based on the frontal expansion of the pri-
mate brain, giving rise to novel symbolic and language-dependent
capacities.
In humans there is no anatomical or physiological barrier
between paleocortex and neocortex. We therefore propose, as an
hypothesis, that like neocortex, the hippocampal complex helps to
specify conscious experiences as well as encoding episodic mem-
ories. dGW proposes that any region of neocortex can function
as a source or receiving region for conscious experiences. We
would therefore add “paleocortex,” including the hippocampus,
to “neocortex.” What may be distinctive about the hippocam-
pal complex is its role in encoding and decoding of conscious
episodes into widely distributed memory traces. There is direct
evidence from brain recordings in the MTL (Panagiotaropoulos
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FIGURE 12 | Hippocampal-neocortical binding and broadcasting.The
hippocampal complex in relation to the neocortex. Notice that the flow of
information streams in both directions, with the interesting exception of the
subiculum. Thus resonant adaptation can take place in almost all regions of
the hippocampal-neocortical complex. This region appears as a major
convergence and broadcasting zone, and has been proposed to combine the
dorsal and ventral streams of visual cortex (Shimamura, 2010). Direct MTL
neuronal recording shows responding to conscious, but not unconscious
visual input. Phylogenetically, the hippocampus is ancestral to the neocortex,
and controls a fully autonomous sensorimotor brain.
et al., 2012), which follow the conscious percept in a binocular
rivalry task, rather than the physical stimulus.
This seems to be contradicted by the classical case of patient
HM, a rare case of very precise surgical excision of the bilateral
MTL, which contains the hippocampal complex. HM appeared
to have normal conscious perception, while his episodic memory
was lost. HM’s surgery therefore seemed to dissociate conscious
perception from memory. HM was studied over a 60-year period
and is still an important source of insight.
Cortical impairments are often difficult to interpret function-
ally, because patients spontaneously reorganize their behavior and
cortex to compensate. For example, cutting the corpus callosum
destroys about 200 million axons linking the hemispheres, but
patients learn to use cross-body arm and eye movements to com-
pensate. Early split brain patients seemed to show no impairments
at all; careful experimental tests later on showed the precise nature
of their functional losses. A similar debate occurred about the
results of prefrontal lobotomy, stroke, minimal brain damage, and
the like.
SUMMARY
A GW is a functional hub of signal binding and propagation in
a population of loosely coupled signaling agents. Neurons and
neuronal cell assemblies can be defined as such agents when they
respond selectively to input.
Conscious experiences may reflect a GW function in the brain.
The brain has many anatomical hubs, but conscious percepts are
unitary and internally consistent at any given moment. This sug-
gests that a brain-based GW capacity cannot be limited to only
one anatomical hub. Rather, it should be sought in a dynamic and
coherent binding capacity – a functional hub – for neural signaling
over multiple networks. A number of findings are consistent with
the theory.
In humans the C-T complex underlies reportable conscious
percepts, concepts, FOK, visual images and executive functions.
While subcortical areas are often sometimes proposed to specify
conscious contents, the human evidence is slight and disputed.
Because cortex and thalamus are interleaved so densely as to con-
stitute a single functional system, we will refer here to the C-T
system as a whole. C-T pathways permit constant reentrant sig-
naling, so that multiple spatiotopic maps can sustain or inhibit
each other. The daily states of the core are controlled by basal
brain nuclei.
Global workspace theory follows the historic distinction
between the “focus” of experience vs. the largely implicit back-
ground of experience. Extensive evidence shows that visual and
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auditory consciousness flows from the respective sensory cortices
to frontoparietal regions. This directionality differentiates GW
dynamics from information integration theory and dynamic core
theory.
Cortico-thalamic core is a great mosaic of multi-layered two-
dimensional neuronal arrays. Each array of cell bodies and neurites
projects to others in topographically systematic ways. Since all C-
T pathways are bidirectional, signaling is “adaptively resonant”
(reentrant). In this complex, layered two-dimensional arrays are
systematically mirrored between cortex and thalamus, region by
region.
The C-T nexus appears to be the most parallel-interactive struc-
ture in the brain, allowing for efficient signal routing from any
neuronal array to any other. This connectivity is different from
other structures that do not directly enable conscious contents, like
the cerebellum. The cerebellum is organized in modular clusters
that can run independently of each other, in true parallel fashion.
But in the C-T core any layered array of cortical or thalamic tissue
can interact with any other, more like the world-wide web than a
server farm.
Cortico-thalamic pathways run in all canonical directions and
follow small-world organization, so that each array is efficiently
linked to many others. The entire system acts as an oscillatory
medium, with markedly different global regimes in conscious and
unconscious states.
Global workspace dynamics interprets the traditional distinc-
tion between the “object” and “ground” of experiences as a direc-
tional flow between the moment-to-moment focus of conscious
experience vs. the implicit background and sequelae of focal
contents. The proposed directionality of broadcasting suggests
a testable distinction with information integration theory and
dynamic core theory.
For example, while sensory experiences are proposed to bind
and broadcast from posterior cortex, “fringe conscious” FOK
plausibly emerge from non-sensory cortices, and may therefore
broadcast rostrocaudally.
Finally, dGW suggests the counter-intuitive idea that in intact
humans, the MTL supports conscious episodes. The classic lesion
case of HM seems to contradict that idea, but traditional psy-
chophysical testing does not show episodic organization. We
therefore suggest that the positive evidence from brain recording
methods for conscious experience in MTL may outweigh lesion
evidence against it, given the well-established tendency toward
cortical reorganization after injury.
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APPENDIX
BASIC EVIDENCE
1. Raw EEG signature: conscious states show irregular, low-
amplitude, and fast EEG activity 12–200 Hz, using both
intracranial and surface measures. Unconscious states tend to
show regular, high-amplitude, and slow voltages at less than
4 Hz.
2. Cortex and thalamus: consciousness depends on the thala-
mocortical complex, turned on and off by brainstem neu-
romodulation. Cortical regions are bidirectionally linked to
corresponding layered arrays in thalamus.
3. Widespread brain activity: conscious contents are associ-
ated with widespread brain activation related to the content.
Unconscious stimulation evokes only local cortical activity.
Conscious scenes also involve wide effects outside the focus
of current conscious contents, as indicated by implicit learn-
ing, episodic memory, biofeedback training of autonomic and
motor function, and the like.
4. Wide range of contents: consciousness has an extraordinary
range of different contents – perception in the various senses,
endogenous imagery, emotional feelings, inner speech, con-
cepts, action-related ideas and “fringe” experiences such as
feelings of familiarity.
5. Informativeness: consciousness may fade when signals
become redundant; a loss of information may also lead to a loss
of conscious access. Studies of attentional selection also show
a strong preference for more informative conscious stimuli.
6. The rapidly adaptive and fleeting nature of conscious events:
immediate experience of the sensory past may last a few sec-
onds, and our fleeting present is perhaps 10–30 s, the duration
of working memory when arbitrary material can be accessed at
will. In contrast, vast bodies of unconscious knowledge reside
in long-term memory.
7. Internal consistency: consciousness is marked by a consis-
tency constraint. For example, while multiple meanings of
most words are active for a brief time after presentation, only
one becomes conscious at any moment. In general, of two
mutually inconsistent stimuli presented simultaneously, only
one can become conscious.
8. Limited capacity and seriality: the capacity of consciousness
at any given moment seems limited to one consistent scene
(see above). The flow of such scenes is serial, in contrast with
the massive parallelism of the brain as observed directly.
9. Sensory binding: the sensory brain is functionally segregated
such that different cortical areas are specialized to respond to
different features such as shape, color, or object motion. One
classic question is how these functionally segregated regions
coordinate their activities in order to generate the gestalts of
ordinary conscious perception.
10. Self-attribution: conscious experiences are always attributed
to an experiencing self, the “observing self” as James called it.
Self-functions appear to be associated with midline regions of
cortex in humans.
11. Accurate reportability: conscious contents are reportable by a
wide range of voluntary responses, often with very high accu-
racy. The standard operational index of consciousness is based
on accurate reportability.
12. Subjectivity and privacy: consciousness is marked by the exis-
tence of a private flow of events available only to the expe-
riencing subject, though much of it is available for public
report.
13. Focus-fringe structure: while consciousness tends to be
thought of as a focal, clearly articulated set of contents,
“fringe conscious” events, like feelings of familiarity, the TOT
experience, etc., are also important.
14. Facilitation of learning: there is very little evidence for long-
term learning of unconscious input. In contrast, the evi-
dence of learning of conscious episodes is overwhelming.
Even implicit learning requires conscious attention to the
stimuli from which implicit regularities are (unconsciously)
inferred.
15. Stability of contents: conscious contents are impressively
stable, given the variability of input that is dealt with.
Even abstract contents such as beliefs, concepts, and the
motivational self are remarkably stable over years.
16. Allocentricity: neural representations of external objects make
use of diverse frames of reference. Conscious scenes, generally
speaking, have allocentric character, though they are shaped
by egocentric and other unconscious frameworks.
17. Conscious knowing and decision making: consciousness is
obviously useful for knowing the world around us, as well as
for knowing certain of our own internal processes. Conscious
intentionality may be particularly well suited for voluntary
decision making.
18. Orientation to time, place, self, and other.
19. Simple working memory.
20. Intermediate recall.
21. Attention, mental effort, and calculation.
22. Simple language, such as naming common objects.
23. Basic visuomotor skills.
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 200 | 22
